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Abstract
This paper develops a theory which investigates how firms’ choice
of corporate organization is affecting firm performance and the
nature of competition in international markets. We develop a
model in which firms’ organisational choices determine hetero-
geneity across firms in size and productivity in the same industry.
We then incorporate these organisational choices in a Krugman
cumMelitz and Ottaviano model of international trade. We show
that the toughness of competition in a market depends on who
- headquarters or middle managers - have power in firms. Fur-
thermore, we propose two new margins of trade adjustments: the
monitoring margin and the organizational margin. International
trade may or may not lead to an increase in aggregate productiv-
ity of an industry depending on which of these margins dominate.
Trade may trigger firms to opt for organizations which encourage
the creation of new ideas and which are less well adapt to price
and cost competition.
JEL Classification: F12, F14, L22, D23
Keywords: international trade with endogenous firm organiza-
tions and endogenous toughness of competition, firm heterogene-
ity, power struggle in the firm.
1 Introduction
Until recently international trade theory treated firms as a black box. The
firm is characterized by a production function according to which the fac-
tors of production (capital, labor) are transformed into consumption goods.
Moreover, these firms are assumed to be of equal size and productivity. In
reality, however, firms consist of organizations with an inner life and differ
in size, productivity, and type of firm organization.
Firm heterogeneity in size and productivity in the same industry are now
widely recognized in various empirical firm level studies (Bernard and Jensen
1999, Clerides, Lach and Tybout 1998. A number of recent papers have in-
troduced firm heterogeneity into models of international trade ( Melitz 2003,
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum 2000, and Melitz and Ottaviano 2005).
In all these specifications, the basic ingredients are the same. Firms face an
exogenous ex-ante distribution of potential productivity levels. After uncer-
taincy is realized, entry and competition provide an endogenous mechanism
for selection of the equilibrium distribution of productivity within an indus-
try. Trade integration, affecting somewhat the degree of market competition
leads to a reallocation to high productivity firms within a sector, with an
increase in aggregate productivity providing additional sources of gains from
trade for economies.1
But what determines differences in productivity and size across firms in
the same industry in the first place? Several empirical studies have attempted
to clear away productivity differences among firms through better measures
of inputs (capital, material, skills) and explicit measures of technology such
as Research and Development or Information and Communication Technolo-
gies. But an unexplained residual remains. A recent study by Bloom and
Van Reenen (2006) attempts to explain these residual differences in firm per-
formance by differences in management practices across firms and countries.
Using an elaborate measure of management quality they find that better
management practices are significantly associated with higher productivity,
profitability, sales growth and firm-survival rates in the four countries US,
UK, France, and Germany.
1For a recent survey, see Bernard et al (2007).
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Figure 1: Firm Productivity and Level of Centralization
In this paper we focus on understanding the sources of firms’ ex-ante
heterogeneity and their implications for competition and international trade.
We consider the firms’ mode of organization as one natural candidate for
the source of firm’s productivity heterogeneity. The type of organization
may well explain differences in management practices described in Bloom
and Van Reenen (2006). We take a first look at the relationship between
corporate organization and productivity in Figure 1. The figure plots the
pattern between firms’ productivity (captured by firms’sales per worker) and
the firms’ mode of organization. We capture corporate organization by the
level of centralization of decision making inside the corporation. Firms are
ranked by their level of centralization over several corporate decisions. The
numbers in Figure 1 are averages over several corporate decisions ranging
between 1 and 5 with 1 as a central decision taken at the CEO level at the
top of the organization and 5 as a decentral decision taken at the divisional
level.2
2The corporate decisions include the decision over acquisitions, financial decisions, the
decision over new strategy, transfer pricing, the decision over a new product, R&D expen-
diteures, the decision over the budget, hiring more than 10 percent of current personnel,
hiring two workers, change of supplier, price increase of product, decision over product
price, moderate wage increase, firing of personnel, the decision of hiring a secretary. For
a ranking of these decisions and the description of the data, see Marin and Verdier (2006)
and Marin (2006).
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The pattern appears to be inverted U-shaped with the most productive
firms having a management style in which both headquarters as well as mid-
dle managers are involved in the decision making inside the corporation.3
This pattern raises the question - what forces explain the relationship be-
tween the observed diversity in corporate organization on the one hand and
the pattern of heterogeneity among firms in productivity on the other? More
specifically, do firms differ in terms of size and productivity because they
adopt different types of organizations? Or is the reverse the case that firms
have different organizations because they differ in size and productivity?
In earlier work (Marin and Verdier (2003, 2006)) we investigate the second
link by focusing on how factor endowments on the one hand and international
competition on the other are affecting firm size and the mode of organization
firms choose. We find that firms that are neither too skill intensive nor too
labour intensive will choose firm organizations in which power is delegated
to the divisional level to keep middle managers’ initiative alife. We also find
that larger more profitable firms will delegate decision control to empower
their middle managers. In this paper we are reversing the question by asking
how firms’ organizational choices determine heterogeneity across firms in size
and productivity in the same industry. We develop a model in which firms’
choice of corporate organization is affecting firm performance and the nature
of competition in international markets. We introduce organizational choices
in a Krugman cum Melitz and Ottaviano model of international trade. Our
model simultaneously determines firms’ organizational choices and hetero-
geneity across firms in size and productivity. More precisely, we combine
within industry heterogeneity of Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano
(2003) with power in the firm of Marin and Verdier (2006 and 2007). This
allows us to study the impact of corporate organization on firm productivity
and on the nature of competition in international markets. Moreoever, it al-
lows us to analyse the impact of international trade on aggregate productivity
in an industry.
3We will later define an organization in which headquarters as well as the division level
make decisions (level of centralization of around 3) as a P-organization. In terms of the
model this is an organization in which the principal runs the firm with the cooperation of
the agent. We define an organization to be centrally organized as an O-organization (level
of centralization of around 1) which is a single managed firm run by the principal alone.
Finally, we define an organization to be decentrally organized as an A-organization run
by the divisional manager (level of centralization of around 5).
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The paper contributes in several respects to this literature. Antras and
Helpman (2004) ask how an exogenous distribution of productivity among
firms determine organizational choices on sourcing. Melitz (2003) introduces
firm productivity heterogeneity into a Krugman model of trade under monop-
olistic competition by an exogenous equilibrium distribution of productivity.
We endogenize firm heterogeneity in a Krugman model by firms’ choice of or-
ganization. Our model generates an endogenous ’mix’ of firms with different
productivity and size levels which is driven by their organizational choices.
Our model predicts intra-firm reallocations from high cost to low cost
firms resulting in an increase in average productivity of an industry follow-
ing episodes of trade liberalizations similar to Melitz (2003). However, the
mechanism by which this occurs is entirely different. Rather than through
the exit of the least productive firms, trade liberalization increases average
productivity by inducing CEOs/owners in firms to monitor more leading to
a larger fraction of firms in which CEOs have ’real power’ in firms and
in which they choose the cost minimizing project. Hence, the productivity
effect arises inside firms rather than through reallocation between firms.
However, in contrast to Melitz (2003), a trade shock may or may not
increase average productivity depending on the corporate equilibrium that
emerges in the economy. Interestingly, we find that the toughness of compe-
tition in the market becomes endogenous and depends on who - headquarters
or middle managers - have power inside firms. A large enough trade shock
may lower productivity in the liberalizing country by inducing a change in
corporate equilibrium from a P-organization to an A-organization in which
power is delegated to middle managers to promote their incentives to find
new projects for the firm. In this case, the shift in the organizational equilib-
rium towards management empowerment reduces the thoughness of compe-
tition with larger mark-ups and equilibrium profits. Aggregate productivity
declines for two reasons. First, because principals monitor less leading to
a smaller fraction of firms in which principals/owners have ’real power’ in
firms. Second, because competition becomes less intense helping a larger
share of high cost firms survive in the market. Hence, in an empowerment
equilibrium which promotes the creation of ideas for new projects competi-
tion takes place in quality (more varieties) rather than in price. This way the
paper adds two new internal margins of trade adjustment - the monitoring
margin and the organizational margin - to the external margin proposed by
4
Melitz.4
The paper is organized in the following sections. Section 2 presents the
basic model of monopolistic competition in a closed economy. Section 3 de-
termines the optimal mode of firm organization. Section 4 incorporates the
model of firm organization into the framework of monopolistic competition
described in section 2. Section 5 determines the industry equlibrium with
free entry. Section 6 shows how the choice of organization determines hetero-
geneity of firms in terms of size and productivity in the same industry. The
section shows also how the nature of competition in international markets
depends on the corporate equilibrium that emerges in the economy. The
section then determines the productivity dispersion in the different organi-
zational equilibria. Section 7 examines how a trade shock affects aggregate
productivity. Section 8 concludes.
2 The closed economy
2.1 Demand side
Consider an economy with L consumers. Consumer preferences are defined
over a continuum of differentiated varieties indexed by i ∈ Ω and an homoge-
nous good chosen as the numeraire as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2003). They
are given by
U = q0 + β
Z
i∈Ω
qidi−
1
2
γ
Z
i∈Ω
q2i di−
1
2
η
∙Z
i∈Ω
qidi
¸2
where q0 and qi are respectively consumption of the numeraire good and
consumption of variety i of the differentiated sector.The demand parameters
β, γ and η are positive with β and η giving the substitution between the
differentiated varieties and the numeraire and the parameter γ as the degree
of product differentiation between the varieties. Let pi be the price of vari-
ety i. We assume that consumers have positive demands for the numeraire
4Bustos (2005) finds evidence for another internal margin - the innovation margin of
trade adjustment - to be present in Argentina. Chen, Imbs, Scott (2006) find positive
productivity effects in the short run but not in the long run from trade liberalizations in
industrialized countries.
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good. Then standard utility maximization gives the individual inverse de-
mand function :
pi = β − γqi − ηQc
where Qc is total consumption level over all varieties:
Qc =
Z
i∈Ω
qidi
Noting N the measure of the set of varieties Ω with positive demands and
p the average price index
p =
1
N
Z
i∈Ω
pidi
it follows that
p = β − γ
N
Qc − ηQc = β − γ +Nη
N
Qc
Hence, the market demand qi for variety i is given by5:
qi = Lqi =
βL
γ +Nη
− L
γ
pi +
Nη
γ +Nη
L
γ
p (1)
Note that in this linear demand system for varieties, the price elasticity of
demand is now also driven by the ’toughness’ of competition in the market
induced either by a lower average price for varieties p or more product va-
rieties N . The price elasticity of demand increases with lower p and larger
N .6
2.1.1 Production
The numeraire good 0 is produced with constant returns to scale (one unit of
good 0 requires one unit of labor) and under perfect competitive conditions.
5Expression in (1) is valid whenever qi > 0 which will be the case when
pi ≤
1
γ + ηN
(γβ + ηNp)
6For details see Melitz and Ottaviano (2005).
6
Each variety of the differentiated good is produced under monopolistically
competitive conditions. Suppose that a given variety i is produced with
marginal cost ci, then profits for that variety can be written as
πi = qi(pi − ci)
The profit maximizing output level qi = q(ci) and price level pi = p(ci) are
related to each other by:
qi = q(ci) =
L
γ
[p(ci)− ci] (2)
The profit maximizing price can be written as
p(ci) =
1
2
∙
ci +
βγ
γ +Nη
+
Nη
γ +Nη
p
¸
(3)
with the (absolute) markup over price as
m(ci) = p(ci)− ci =
1
2
∙
βγ
γ +Nη
+
Nη
γ +Nη
p− ci
¸
(4)
The average price p and average cost of firms c can be expressed as
p =
c+ βγγ+Nη
2γ+Nη
γ+Nη
(5)
c =
1
N
Z
i∈Ω
cidi (6)
and equilibrium profits of a firm with cost ci are given by
π(ci) =
L
4γ
[cD − ci]2 (7)
where cD is the the cutoff cost level :
cD =
2βγ
2γ +Nη
+
Nη
2γ +Nη
c (8)
reflecting the cost level of a firm which is just indifferent about leaving or
remaining in the industry and earns zero profits. Firms with cost ci < cD
earn positive profits. The cut-off cost level cD captures the ’toughness’ of
competition in an industry. It declines when competition is tougher with
more firms around ( larger N), with more low cost firms in the market (lower
average costs c), and when varieties are closer substitutes (smaller γ). 7
7see Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) for more details.
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3 Power in the Firm
In this section we examine how firms decide over the mode of organization.We
consider a firm with a simple hierarchy consisting of a CEO (the principal P)
hiring a division manager (the agent A) to implement a production project.
There are m potential and a priori identical projects (or ways to produce a
good). Payoffs are ex ante unknown to both parties. Among the m projects,
there is one which yields the highest possible benefit B for the principal
and one which yields the highest possible benefit b for the agent. Let αB be
the principal’s expected benefit when the agent’s preferred project is imple-
mented with (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). Assume, for simplicity, that the agent’s expected
benefit when the principal’s preferred project is implemented is 0. The lower
α, the larger the conflict of interest between the principal and her agent.
Hence, α is a parameter which captures the power struggle in the firm.
B and b are supposed to be known ex ante though the parties do not know
ex ante which project yields such payoff. We assume also that, among the
m projects, there are some with very high negative payoffs to both parties,
implying that choosing randomly a project without being informed is not
profitable to both agents who instead prefer to do nothing (project 0). This
aspect, together with the fact that each uninformed party prefers to rubber-
stamp the other informed’s party suggestion to do nothing, implies that
private information about payoffs gives decision control to the informed party.
In this case, the informed party has ”real power” rather than ”formal power”
in the firm. Thus, there are two sources of power in the firm, because it is
allocated to the manager ”formal authority” which is ex-ante contractible,
or because the manager is better informed, ”real authority”.8
Parties may acquire information on the payoff structure in the following
way. By spending some resource cost :
gP (E) = g
E2
2
the principal P learns the payoff structure of all projects with probability E
and remains uniformed with probability 1− E. Similarly, by exerting some
8As emphasized by Aghion and Tirole (1997), the amount of information acquisition is
at the heart of the distinction between ”formal” and ”real” decision power in firms.
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effort :
gA(e) = ke with e ∈ [0, e], k < b
the agent learns the payoff structure of all projects with probability e and
remains uninformed with probability 1− e.
We assume that the principal is risk neutral and that the agent is infinitely
risk averse with respect to income. Therefore, the agent is not responsive to
monetary incentives and he agrees to receive a fixed wage w equal to his
opportunity cost. His incentives to gather information on projects will be
directly related to the private non pecuniary benefit b he gets from his ”best”
project.
Firms can choose between three types of organizations, a P-organization
in which the CEO/owner has formal power, an A-organization in which the
CEO/owner delegates formal power to the agent, and an O-organization in
which the principal has formal power and in which the agent excerts minimum
effort. The O-organization can be thought of as a single managed firm (run
by the principal) without an internal hierarchy.
Decisions are taken in the following sequence. The principal allocates
formal power to herself (P-organization) or to the agent (A-organization).
Then the two parties collect information about projects’ payoff simultane-
ously. The party who does not have decision power suggests a project (or
nothing) to the other party. Finally, the party with power rubber stamps the
other party’s suggestion or selects an alternative project, or decides to do
nothing. Hence, the party with formal authority, whenever informed, picks
her preferred project. When she remains uninformed ex post, that party
rubber-stamps the suggestion of the other party who, whenever informed,
has real authority over the project choice and gets his preferred project im-
plemented. When neither party has information on the payoff structure, no
project is undertaken by the firm.
Let us look then at the equilibrium informational efforts of the two parties
under each organization. We first compute the Nash equilibria in informa-
tion collection and the resulting payoffs under each organization. Then we
examine which of these organizations yield higher utility to the principal and
is preferred by her.
P-organization
9
We start with the case where the principal has formal power in the firm
and the agent participates actively in the management of the firm (ie. e > 0).
When the principal has formal power, the expected payoffs uP (E, e) for the
principal and νP (E, e) for the agent are given by:
UP (E, e) = EB + (1− E)eαB − gP (E)− w
νP (E, e) = (1−E)eb− gA(e)
With probability E, the principal becomes fully informed about her pay-
offs and picks her preferred project with monetary payoff B, while the agent
receives 0. With probability 1− E, the principal remains uninformed about
payoffs. The agent may then learn with probability e the pay-off structure
and suggest his best project to the principal (who accepts it). The principal
receives a monetary payoff αB while the agent gets his best private benefit
b. Or the agent may remain also uninformed in which case, no project is
undertaken.
The first order conditions of the two parties with respect to efforts E and
e are
Principal: B(1− eα) = gE and Agent: e = e if k ≤ b(1−E)
= 0 if k > b(1−E) (9)
The conditions highlight the trade-off between the principal’s control and
the agent’s initiative. The principal supervises more the higher her stake
in the project (the larger B), the larger the conflict of interest between the
principal and the agent (the lower α) and the lower the agent’s effort e. The
agent, in turn, has more initiative the higher her stake (the larger b) and the
lower the principal’s interference (the lower E). Thus, control comes with
the cost of loosing the agent’s initiative.
The Nash equilibrium level of efforts of this game are given by
e∗P = e, and E
∗
P =
B(1− eα)
g
when B ≤ eBP (α) (10)
e∗P = 0, and E
∗
P =
B
g
when B > eBP (α)
10
with eBP (α) = g(1− k/b)
1− eαeBP (α) captures the threshold level of profits at which the agent’s initiative
is fully crowded out when the principal has formal power. For payoffs overeBP (α), the principal exerts an effort E∗P that kills the initiative of the agent
to acquire information. A P-orgarnization with active participation of the
agent prevails therefore only when B < eBP (α) The equilibrium expected
utility of the principal under this organization is then:
uP (B) = UP (
B(1− eα)
g
, e)
or after substituting (10)
uP (B) =
B2(1− αe)2
2g
+ eαB − w (11)
O-organization
Alternatively, whenever profits are sufficiently large ((ie. B > eBP (α)),
(10) implies that the agent does not actively engage in the firm (ie. e = 0) in
an organizazion with formal power in the hands of the principal. We denote
such an organization as an ”O-organization”. In this case, after substituting
(10), the equilibrium expected utility of the principal is
uO(B) = UP (
B
g
, 0) =
B2
2g
− w (12)
A-organization
Consider now the case when the principal delegates decision control to
the agent and the agent has formal power in the firm. Now the principal
is prevented from overruling the agent’s decision when both have acquired
information. The two parties’ expected payoffs are then
UA(E, e) = eαB + (1− e)EB − gP (E)− w
vA(E, e) = eb− gA(e)
11
Now the agent chooses his preferred project when informed. When the
principal is informed and the agent is uninformed, the principal suggests her
preferred project, which is then implemented by the agent. For b > k, the
Nash equilibrium effort levels are9
e∗A = e and E
∗
A =
B(1− e)
g
(13)
A comparison of the effort levels reveals that the agent’ s initiative is
better promoted under the A-organization compared to the P-organization.
Actually under our specification, the agent will always provide maximum
effort under the A-organization while his initiative will be killed under the
P-organization for suffieicntly large profits of the principal.
After substituting (13), the equilibrium expected utility of the principal
under the A-organization is
uA(B) = UA(
B(1− e)
g
, e) =
B2(1− e)2
2g
+ eαB − w (14)
The Optimal Firm Organization
We turn now to determine the optimal firm organization. We ask how the
parties’ informational efforts respond to exogenous changes in the payoff B
and in the conflict parameter α under each organization. We will endogenous
B and α by product market competition in the next section. We illustrate the
trade-offs the firm faces in its organizational choice with the help of Figure
2.
9When the agent receives a strictly positive benefit βb > 0 with the principal’s preferred
project, there exists as well a threshold eBA given by:
eBA = g(1− k/b)β(1− e)
and such that the agent’s initiative is killed under the A-organization when B > eBA.
Intuitively, above the threshold level eBA the principal’s stakes are so high that she
acquires information E∗A leading to a high probability of intervention which, in equilibrium,
leads again to minimum agent’s effort e∗A = 0 .
12
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Figure 2: The Optimal Organization of the Firm
The B˜P (α) - curve relates the profit level to the incentives inside the firm
and thus to the costs of having control in the firm. Recall that the B˜P (α)
curve represents the threshold level of profits at which the effort incentive of
the agent is killed under the P-organization. B˜P (α) is upward sloping in α
because with an increase in α the conflict of interest between the principal
and the agent declines (the preferences between the principal and the agent
become more similar). At a given profit level B, the principal intervenes
less when the agent’s preferred project is less in conflict with her objectives.
Therefore, the profit level at which the agent’s initiative is crowded out goes
up. In the area below the B˜P (α) -line the P-firm keeps the agent’s initiative
alive, while in the area above B˜P (α) the agent does not exert any effort under
the O-organization.
The B¯(α)- line relates the profit level to the market environment of the
firm and thus captures the gain of having control in terms of the firms’profits.It
is defined by B(α) = 2gα
2−e as the threshold level of profits at which the prin-
cipal is indifferent between the O-firm with e = 0 and the A-firm with the
13
agents maximum initiative e10. B(α) is upward sloping in α because with an
increase in α the conflict declines making delegating power to the agent less
costly to the principal. Therefore, the level of profits at which the principal
is indifferent between the P-firm and the A-firm goes up.
For profit levels below the B˜P (α) -curve the benefit of control outweights
the costs and the firm chooses the P-organization. In fact, at low levels of
profits there is no trade-off between control and initiative, since the agent’s
inititative can be kept alive under the P-organization. At low profit levels
the principal monitors and intervenes little because her stakes are small and
she cares little. Hence, the P-organization gives sufficient initiative to the
agent. For profit levels in between the B˜P (α)- and the B¯(α)- curve, the cost of
control outweights the benefit and the firm opts for the A-organization. There
is a trade-off between control and initiative and the principal delegates formal
power to the agent to keep his initiative and the A-organization emerges as
the optimal mode of organization. For profit levels above the B¯(α)- curve,
the benefit of control again outweights the costs and the firm chooses the
O-organization and looses the initiative of the agent. At high profit levels,
there is again no trade-off between control and initiativ. The principal’s
stakes are so large that she intervenes even under the A-organization leading
to minimum effort by the agent even when he is given formal power in the
organization. Therefore, the principal might as well keep control by choosing
the O-organization. 11
4 Competition and the Power Struggle
We incorporate now the choice of firm organization into the production side
described in section 2. We endogenize profits B and the power struggle in
firms α in this section. Recall the distinction between formal and real power
in the firm. There are two types of firms depending on who - the principal
or the agent - has real (as opposed to formal) power in the organization
More precisely, assume that firms in which the principals’ preferred project
is implemented produce the good with production cost ci = cB. Call these
10This is the relevant comparison because the principal always prefers the P-firm with
e compared to the A-firm with e.
11For a formal proof see Proposition 1 in Marin and Verdier (2006).
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firms ”real P-firms”. Similarly firms in which the agent’s preferred project is
implemented produce the good with larger production cost ci = cb = ϕcB and
ϕ > 1. Call these firms ”real A-firms”. The idea here is that the agent does
not always choose the cost minimizing project but rather one that is best for
him and maximizes his perks. Thus, even in a ’formal P-firm’ in which the
principal keeps formal control, the agent’s preferred high cost project may
get implemented. This will happen when the principal decides not to get
informed and to rubber stamp the agent’s suggestion. We then have ex-post
a ’real A-firm’ in a formal P-organization.
From (7) we can then rewrite the principal’s profits when her best project
is implemented as
B = π(cB) =
L
4γ
[cD − cB]2 =
Lc2B
4γ
[ecD − 1]2 with ecD = cDcB (15)ecD is the cost gap between firms with zero profits cD and the low cost
P-firms cB. The smaller this gap the harder it is to earn positive profits in the
market. Thus, ecD reflects the thoughness of competition that a firm faces.
Similarly, the conflict parameter α can also be expressed as a function of the
cost gap ecD
α =
π(cb)
π(cB)
=
∙ecD − ϕecD − 1
¸2
(16)
The smaller ecD, the tougher is competition in the market and the larger
is the conflict of interest between the principal and her agent (the smaller α).
The power struggle in firms becomes more intense with a decline in relative
profits between an A-firm π(cb) in which the agent runs the firm and a
P-firm π(cB) in which the principal has power in the firm. Relative profits
between these two types of firms decline with tougher competition, because
high-cost A-firms’ revenues go donw by more than revenues of low-cost P-
firms. A-firms try to fight the loss in revenue s by lowering mark-ups by
more than P-firms. Hence, with more intense competition it matters more
who runs the firm and delegation of power to the agent becomes more costly
to firms.
Low cost ”real P-firms” set lower prices p, produce larger outputs q and
earn higher revenues r and profits π than high cost ”real A-firms” as can be
15
seen from the following expressions
qB = q(cB) = L cB
ecD − 1
2γ
while qb = q(cb) = L cB
ecD − ϕ
2γ
pB = p(cB) = cB
ecD + 1
2
while pb = p(cb) = cB
ecD + ϕ
2
rB = r(cB) =
Lc2B
4γ
¡ec2D − 1¢ while rb = r(cb) = Lc2B4γ ¡ec2D − ϕ2¢
πB = π(cB) =
Lc2B
4γ
[ecD − 1]2 while πb = π(cb) = Lc2B
4γ
[ecD − ϕ]2
However, low cost ”real P-firms” do not pass on all of the cost differential to
consumers in the form of lower prices. They also set higher markups than
high cost ”real A-firms”. This can be seen by expressing the markup of ”real
P-firms” and ”real A-firms”, respectively as a function of ecD
mB = m(cB) = cB
ecD − 1
2
, and mb = m(cb) = cB
ecD − ϕ
2
The two relationships (15) and (16) describe how the thoughness of com-
petition, given by the threshold parameter ecD, jointly affects profits and the
power struggle inside the firm. Eliminating ecD , they define a relationship
between B and α that has to be satisfied by any firm. From (15) we get
ecD = 1 + 2cB
r
γ
L
√
B
and from (16) we have ecD = ϕ−√α
1−√α
Therefore, the relationship between B and α is given by
B = bB(α) = ∙ ϕ− 1
1−√α
¸2 L
γ
c2B
4
(17)
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5 Industry Equilibrium
In this section we derive the industry equilibrium with free entry for a given
choice of firm organization.12 The timing of events is as follows. In a first
stage, firms decide whether or not to enter the market and to hire an agent to
monitor projects. At this stage, there is free entry. In a second stage, firms
decide who has formal power in the organization by choosing between the
formal P-firm and the formal A-firm. In a third stage, information collection
efforts are realized by the two parties and a project is selected. This, in
turn, determines who has real power in the organization. Finally there is
production and consumption.
The free entry conditions for a given choice of firm organization can be
written asMax{uP (B), uA(B), uO(B)} = 0 where uP (B), uA(B), and uO(B)
are the profit levels of the firm under each organization P , A or O as given,
by (11), (14) and (12) respectively. The ”Max” argument in the free entry
conditions reflects the fact that each firm decides about its optimal type after
market entry. We normalize w = 1. Three types of free entry equilibria are
possible:
i) Equilibrium with P-organization and e∗P = e
The free entry condition in such a regime is
uP (B) = g
(E∗P )2
2
+ eαB − 1 = 0 (18)
This gives a unique positive solution BP = B∗P (α) which is the profit
level required to make a firm indifferent between entering and not entering
the market as a formal P organization. Obviously, an equilibrium in this
regime exists if and only if B∗P (α) ≤ eBP (α)
ii) Equilibrium with A-organization and e∗A = e.
The free entry condition in such a regime is
uA(B) = g
(E∗A)
2
2
+ eαB − 1 = 0 (19)
12In Marin and Verdier (2006) we determine the free entry corporate equilibria in which
firms choose the profit maximizing mode of organization and in which they have an incen-
tive to enter the market with this organization.
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The free entry condition gives similarly a unique positive solution BA =
B∗A(α). An equilibrium in this regime exists if and only if eBP (α) ≤ B∗A(α) <
B(α).
iii) Equilibrium with O-organization and e∗P = 0
Finally the free entry condition in such a regime is
U0(B) = g
(E∗0)2
2
− 1 = 0 (20)
which gives the solution BP =
√
2g. Such an equilibrium exists when√
2g > B(α).
Note that for all values of α, B∗A(α) > B∗P (α). The formal A-organization,
by giving less formal power to the principal, is less efficient than the formal
P-organization. Hence, firms require a larger recurrent profit B to enter the
market with a formal A-organization compared to a formal P-organization
to cover the fixed cost of market entry (ie. the wage rate for the middle
manager w = 1).13
6 Firm Heterogeneity
The model generates ex-post an endogenous pattern of heterogeneity across
firms in size and producivity in the same industry. This arises in the following
way. Firms choose the type of organization. This choice allocates ’formal’
power to principals (P- or O-organization) or agents (A-organization). The
type of organization, in turn, determines the amount of information collection
undertaken by principals and agents which in turn determines the probability
of success of finding a project for the firm. It also determines who - head-
quarters or middle managers - have ’real’ power in firms. Firm heterogeneity
13For more details, see Marin and Verdier (2006). When the cost differential ϕ − 1
between ”high cost” and ”low cost” firms is not too large (such that ”high cost” firms
make positive recurrent profits in a monopolistic equilibrium. with ”low cost” firms), we
show in Marin and Verdier (2006) that there exists at least one free entry organizational
equilibrium (Be, αe) (defined by the free entry conditions (18), (19) and (20) and the
condition (17) on bB(α)) such that a) firms choose optimally their organizations, b) firms
maximize profits by choosing the level of production and price and c) there is free entry.
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in productivity or costs in an industry arises because even under a ’formal’
P-organizational equilibrium in which all firms in an industry adopt an or-
ganization in which principals have ’formal’ power in the corporation, there
will be a share of firms in which agents have ’real’ power (real A-firms) when
principals in these firms decide not to become informed and to follow the
suggestion for projects of their informed middle managers. Principals then
implement the high cost projects preferred by middle managers. Similarly, in
a formal A-organizational equilibrium in which all firms in an industry dele-
gate ’formal’ power to their middle managers, there will be a share of firms
in which principals have ’real’ power (real P-firms) when middle managers
implement low cost projects suggested by informed principals. This way the
number of low-cost P-firms and high-cost A-firms in an industry is endoge-
neous and depends crucially on the organizational equilibrium that emerges
in the economy and on the amount of information collection by principals
and agents.
6.0.2 Competition in a P-Equilibrium.
We turn now to show that the nature of competition in a market becomes
endogenous and depends on the corporate equilibrium organization that
emerges. Note that by the law of large numbers, given a number of entrants
M in the industry, only N = M [E + (1 − E)e] of them have information
on how to produce in which principals or agents are successfull at collect-
ing information about possible projects for the firm. We can express average
costs and cost dispersion in an industry under the P- and A-organizational
equilibria 14 Average marginal costs in an industry c become a function of
the ’organizational mix’of firms (which is the share of low-cost P-firms and
high-cost A-firms in an industry, respectively).
Average Costs and the Thoughness of Competition Consider first
the formal P-organizational equilibrium in which firms choose the P-organization
14Note that in an O-organizational equilibrium, there is no firm heterogeneity. In this
equilibrium only projects discovered by the firm/principal are implemented and thus all
active firms have the same cost minimizing technology with production cost cB. Therefore,
only the organizational equilibria P and A have to be examined.
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as the optimal mode of organization. Average marginal costs in an industry
can then be expressed as
cP (E) =
ME
M [E + (1−E)e]cB +
M(1−E)e
M [E + (1−E)e]cb =
[E + (1−E)eϕ]
[E + (1−E)e] cB
(21)
With probability E the principal gets informed and chooses the project
with low costs cB. With probability (1 − E)e the principal does not get in-
formed and the agent gets informed in which case he chooses the project with
high costs cb. Under the law of large numbers,
EP
[EP+(1−EP )e]
and (1−EP )e
[EP+(1−EP )e]
equal the fraction of low cost ’real P-firms’ and high cost ’real A-firms’ in the
economy. Call these fractions the ’organizational mix’ of firms in an industry.
We can then express the thoughness of competition in the market when
principals have formal power in firms as the zero profit cut-off cost level
ecPD = ecPD(E,N) = 2βγ/cB2γ +Nη + Nη2γ +Nη [E + (1−E)eϕ][E + (1−E)e]
with N = M [E + (1 − E)e], as the ”effective” number of varieties pro-
duced.15 The toughness of competition increases (ecPD declines) with the num-
ber of varietiesN and with the amount of information collection by principals
E (with the share of low cost real P-firms). In fact, an increase inE biases the
organizational mix between low cost real P-firms and high cost real A-firms
in favour of the low-cost P-firms. As a result, average costs in an industry
cP (E) decline and the thougness of competition in the economy increases.
Cost dispersion The variance of costs in an industry under the P-organization
can be expressed as a function of E
VP (E) =
E
[E + (1− E)e]
£
cB − cP (E)
¤2
+
(1−E)e
[E + (1−E)e]
£
cb − cP (E)
¤2
15When M firms enter not all of them find a profitable project to produce and hence
the effective number of successfull firms is N .
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which can be rewritten to
VP (E) =
E(1−E)e [ϕ− 1]2
[E + (1−E)e]3 cB
2
Differentiating VP (E) reveals that the function is bell shaped. More pre-
cisely,
dVP (E)
dE
≤ 0 if and only if E2(1− e)− 2E + e ≤ 0
Hence there exists a value EP (e) ∈]0, 1[ such that VP (E) is increasing in
E if and only if E ≤ EP (e). 16
6.0.3 Competition in an A-Equilibrium.
Average Costs and the Thoughness of Competition Similarly, in a
formal A-organizational equilibrium in which the A-organization maximizes
profits of firms, average marginal costs in an industry are
cA(E) =
Me
M [e+ (1− e)E]cb+
M(1− e)E cB
M [e+ (1− e)E]cB =
[E + (ϕ−E)e]
[E + (1−E)e] cB (22)
with e
[EA+(1−EA)e]
and E(1−e)
[E+(1−EA)e]
as the fraction of high cost real A-firms
and low cost real P-firms in the economy.
The thoughness of competition in the market when principals delegate
formal power to middle managers can be expressed as
ecAD = ecAD(E,N) = 2βγ/cB2γ +Nη + Nη2γ +Nη [E + (ϕ−E)e][E + (1−E)e]
Comparing the cut-off cost levels in the two organizational equilibria re-
veals that ecPD < ecAD. Competition is tougher in a P-equilibrium compared to
an A-equilibrium as principals monitor more in the former (an increase in E
) which biases the organizational mix in favour of the low-cost P-firms with
cP (E) < cA(E).
16Formally, EP (e) is the root between 0 and 1 of the equation E2(1− e)− 2E + e = 0.
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Cost dispersion Similarly, in a formal A-organizational equilibrium, the
cost dispersion is given by
VA(E) =
(1− e)E
[e+ (1− e)E]
£
cB − cA(E)
¤2
+
e
[e+ (1− e)E]
£
cb − cA(E)
¤2
which can be rewritten to
VA(E) =
Ee(1− e) [ϕ− 1]2
[E + (1−E)e]3 cB
2
Differentiating VA(E) shows that the function is bell shaped. More pre-
cisely
dVA(E)
dE
≤ 0 if and only if e− 2(1− e)E ≤ 0
VA(E) is increasing in E if and only if E ≤ EA(e) 17
Comparing the variances VP (E) and VA(E) in the two organizational
equilibria for a given value of E it is clear that for E 6= 0,
VP (E) ≤ VA(E) if and only if e ≤ E
Hence, for the same effort level E, the P-organizational equilibrium ex-
hibits less cost dispersion than an A-organizational equilibrium if the firm/principal
is more efficient than the agent in collecting information.
The two variance functions are plotted in Figure 3. As can be seen, the
cost dispersion under a P-organization is first increasing faster and then de-
creasing faster with E than that of the A-organization. The intuition for this
pattern is as follows. In any organizational regime (P or A), a higher effort of
information collection E of the firm implies more firms with low costs cB. As
average costs move away from cb towards cB, we have a decrease in the wedge
[cB − c(E)]2 and conversely an increase in the wedge [cb − c(E)]2. Now, in
17EA(e) = [e/2(1− e)] and one can show that EA(e) > EP (e) as drawn in Figure 3.
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VPE
VAE
0 eEPe  EAe 
Figure 3: Cost Dispersion in Organizational Equilibria
a P-organizational equilibrium, because the firm has formal power, the frac-
tion of low cost firms (ie. with cB) is more sensitive to a change in E than
in an A-organizational equilibrium. Hence, [cB − c(E)]2 and [cb − c(E)]2are
more sensitive to a change in the principal’s effort E in the P-organization
compared to the A-organization.18
At low levels of E, wedges of type [cB − c(E)]2 do not have much weight
in the variance terms VP (E) and VA(E). Hence, much of the comparison be-
tween VP (E) and VA(E) is driven by the behavior of wegdes
¯¯
cb − cP (E)
¯¯
and¯¯
cb − cA(E)
¯¯
. It follows that the variance of costs under a P-organizational
equilibrium is increasing faster than the same variance under an A-organizational
equilibrium. Conversely, when E is close to 1, variations in [cB − c(E)]2 ex-
plain much of the shape of the variances VP (E) and VA(E). Thus, at large
18Formally this can be seen from the following expressions.
¯¯
cB − cP (E)
¯¯
=
(1−E)e
[E+(1−E)e](ϕ − 1)cB and
¯¯
cb − cP (E)
¯¯
= E[E+(1−E)e](ϕ − 1)cB for the P-equilibrium and¯¯
cB − cA(E)
¯¯
= e[E+(1−E)e] (ϕ − 1)cB and
¯¯
cb − cA(E)
¯¯
= E(1−e)[E+(1−E)e] (ϕ − 1)cB for the
A-equilibrium. Indeed,
¯¯
cB − cP (E)
¯¯
declines faster with E than
¯¯
cB − cA(E)
¯¯
, while¯¯
cb − cP (E)
¯¯
increases faster with E than
¯¯
cb − cA(E)
¯¯
.
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values of E, the cost dispersion under the P-organzation declines faster with
E than under the A-organization.
We are now in a position to examine how trade integration affects the
pattern of firm heterogeneity in an industry. We focus on the effect on the
first moment of the distribution (ie. average productivity) and discuss two
new internal margins of adjustments of trade: the monitoring margin and
the organizational margin.
7 Trade Integration and Aggregate Produc-
tivity
Consider two countries H and F which are identical in all dimensions
but market size with LH > LF . Assume that there is free trade between
H and F . Perfect trade integration is equivalent to an increase in market
size from LH or LF to LH + LF . A change in market size L affects the
productivity of the economy via two channels. First, a change in L affects
the distribution between high and low cost firms. Second, a change in L
affects the optimal pattern of organization. Hence, trade integration triggers
a productivity effect within a given organizational equilibrium (P or A) and
across organizational equilibria when the trade shock induces firms to change
their equilibrium organization. We now discuss each effect in turn.19
7.1 The Monitoring Margin of Trade Adjustment
Consider first a small trade shock. A small increase in market size L in-
creases firms’ outputs and profits, inducing firm entry, tougher competition
and smaller markups. With increased competition delegation of power inside
the firm becomes more costly and tends to increase the power struggle be-
tween principals and managers (lower α). A larger conflict of interest in firms
and bigger profits, in turn, stimulate monitoring by principals (increased ef-
fort E), making it more likely that the initiative of the agent is crowded out
19In Marin and Verdier (2006) we derive the conditions under which a change in L
triggers a change in corporate organization.
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Figure 4: Average Costs in an Industry and Organizational Equilibria
under the central P-organization. When the trade shock is not too large,
profits and the power stuggle in firms increase only little and principals mon-
itor only little under the P-organization. Hence, principals’ monitoring does
not kill the initiative of agents and firms keep the P-organization. As long as
the trade shock is not too large no change in corporate organization occurs
20
The effect of a small trade shock on average productivity or equivalently
on average costs in an industry is illustrated in Figure 4. The figure plots
how average costs in an industry in the two organizational equilibria P and
A cP (E) and cA(E) are affected by a change in E (which affects the fraction
of low cost real P-firms in the economy). Three things are noteworthy. First,
for a given value of E, average costs in a P-organizational equilibrium cP (E)
are always below average costs in an A-organizational equilibrium cA(E).
20For details on the comparative statics of a change in market size, see section 4 in
Marin and Verdier (2006).
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The reason is simply that the fraction of low cost firms is larger in a P-
equilibrium than in an A-equilibrium. Second, both cP (E) and cA(E) are
declining with E, as an increase in E is directly related to an increase in
the fraction of low cost firms in both regimes. Third, cP (E) declines more
sharply with an increase in E than cA(E) (ie. cP (E) is steeper than cA(E)),
because the fraction of low cost firms is larger in a P-regime than in an A-
regime. Formally, this can be seen from differentiating (21) and (22) with
respect to E
dcP (E)
dE
= − (ϕ− 1)e
[E + (1−E)e]2 cB and
dcA(E)
dE
= − (ϕ− 1)e(1− e)
[E + (1−E)e]2 cB (23)
A small trade shock increases equilibrium profits B within an organiza-
tional regime.This induces more monitoring EP or EA by principals. As a
result the population of active firms is biased towards ”real P-firms” at the
expense of ”real A-firms”. This reallocation from high cost firms to low cost
firms reduces average production costs in an industry within each organi-
zational regime. Furthermore, a small trade shock increases the conflict of
interest between firms and managers in the corporation. As can be seen
from (9), within the P-organizational equilibrium the increase in the power
struggle in firms also increases monitoring EP by principals, reducing even
further average production costs cP (E) within this equilibrium. From this
discussion we may conclude
Statement 1: A small trade shock increases average productivity by in-
ducing the monitoring margin of trade adjustment . As a result the fraction
of low cost P-firms increases at the expense of high cost A-firms. Average
productivity increases more in a formal P-organizational equilibrium than in
a formal A- organizational equilibrium.
7.2 The Organizational Margin of Trade Adjustment
Consider now a large trade shock. When the trade shock is large, profits and
the power stuggle in firms become sufficiently large that the stakes rise and
principals in firms start to monitor intensively and kill the initiative of agents
under the P-organization. To prevent this from happening principals delegate
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Figure 5: Average Costs in an Industry across Organizational Equilibria
formal power to agents to keep their initiative alife and the A-organization
emerges as the new corporate equilibrium21
To assess the impact of a change in organization from P to A on aggregate
productivity, three distinct effects have to be evaluated. They are illustrated
in Figure 5. Quadrant I reproduces Figure 4, while quadrant II plots the
principal’s monitoring under the two organizational equilibria EP (B) and
EA(B) as a function of profits B.
The first effect is the composition effect between low cost P-firms and
high cost A-firms across organizational equilibria P and A. In fact, for a
given value of monitoring E by firms, an A-organizational equilibrium is
21See Marin and Verdier (2006), section 4 for the conditions under which an increase in
market size triggers a shift from the P-organization to the A-organization.
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more likely to provide agents with real power in the firm compared to a P-
organizational equilibrium. Hence, at a given value of E, an A-equilibrium
has a larger fraction of high cost ”real A-firms” than low costs ”real P-firms”.
This is reflected in quadrant I by the fact that cA(E) is always above cP (E)
for all levels of E.
The second effect is the monitoring effect across organizational equilibria
P and A. At a given profit level B, a ”formal P-firm” monitors more than
a ”formal A-firm” (ie. EP (B) > EA(B) as can be seen from (9) and (13)).
This is illustrated in quadrant II of Figure 11 by the fact that the EP (B)
curve is always above the EA(B) curve.
Finally, the last effect is the profit effect. Indeed, given that a formal
A-organization is less efficient that a formal P-organization at any value of
recurrent profit, it follows that the required profits under free entry in a A-
equilibrium BA = B∗A(αA) are larger than the required profit BP = B∗P (αP ),
in a P-equilibrium. From this it follows that the value of monitoring in formal
A-organizations EA = (1 − e)BA/g is larger than in formal P-organizations
EP = (1 − eαP )BP/g. This is illustrated in quadrant II of Figure 5 by the
fact that BA is above BP on the vertical axis.
Now we are ready to see how the three effects together influence average
costs across organizational equilibria from P to A.We simply need to compare
the values of cA(EA) corresponding to point A with cP (EP ) corresponding
to point P. The composition effect is shown in quadrant I by a vertical move
from point P on cP (E) to point Q on cA(E) for the same value of monitoring
EP . This effect clearly contributes to an increase in average costs when the
corporate equilibrium shifts from a P-organization to an A-organization.
The monitoring effect is illustrated in quadrant II by a horizontal move
from point FP with coordinates (EP , BP ) on the curve EP (B) to point FA
on the curve EA(B) with coordinates (EA(BP ), BP ). This effect is shown in
quadrant I by a move from Q to F along cA(E). This effect also increases
average costs across organizational equilibria from P to A.
Finally, the profit effect is illustrated in quadrant II by a move from FA
to point KA along the curve EA(B) increasing profits from BP to BA. This
effect is shown in quadrant I by a move from point F to A along the cA(E)
curve. The profit effect reduces average costs when the industry shifts from
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a P-organization to an A-organization and thus works in opposite direction
to the two other effects. Overall, a trade induced change in organization
from P to A has an ambiguious effect on productivity and depends on the
relative size of each of the three effects. Note that the profit effect has to be
strong enough to compensate the first two effects. When the profit effect is
not too large22, it is likely that a shift in corporate organization from a P-
equilibrium to an A-equilibrium in response to a large trade shock will lower
average productivity in the economy. This discussion can be summarized in
the following statement
Statement 2 : A large trade shock induces the organizational margin of
trade adjustment. The impact of a large trade shock on average productiv-
ity can be decomposed into three effects: the composition effect, the moni-
toring effect, and the profit effect. The composition and monitoring effect
both tend to decrease average productivity with an increase in market size L
and the profit effect tends to increase average productivity. When the profit
effect is not too large, a move from a P-organizational equilibrium to an
A-organizational equilibrium is likely to reduce average
Statements 1 and 2 can be finally summarized in Figure 6 which describes
the evolution of average costs in the economy as a function of market size
L. The curve has three parts cP (L), cA(L) and cO(L) depending on the
organizational equilibrium P , A or O. From statement 1, we know that av-
erage costs are declining within an organizational equilibrium and the curves
cP (L) and cA(L) are declining with market size. In the O-equilibrium the
average cost curve becomes cO(L) = cB, as all active firms are low cost ”real
22Whether the shift in equilibrium profits across organizational equilibria is large or
small depends on how efficient the agent is in collecting information. The less efficient the
agent is in information collection (ie e¿ 1), the smaller is the gap between the free entry
profit curves B∗P and B
∗
A under the two equilibria P and A. Intuitively, when the agent
is not too efficient at getting information on projects, he is unlikely to have real power in
the firm. Hence, it is not too costly to give him formal power in the firm either. In such
a case, the shift in equilibrium profits across regimes is small and therefore average costs
are likely to increase with a move from a P to an A-organizational equilibrium.
.
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Figure 6: Average Costs in an Industry and Market Size
P- firms”. At some threshold value of L = bL, the A-organization emerges
as a new equilibrium and the economy shifts from a P-organization to an
A-organization. This shift introduces a discontinuity in average costs. When
the profit effect is not too large compared to the other two effects average
costs go up (and productivity declines) with an increase in market size as is
illustrated in Figure 6. Hence, average costs (or productivity) are not neces-
sarily a decreasing monotonic function of market size, since firms may find
it optimal to shift from a low cost organizational equilibrium to a high cost
organizational equilibrium with an accompanied increase in average costs in
an industry.
As a result, a sufficiently large trade shock may induce an equilibrium in
the liberalizing country in which managers are empowered to create ideas for
new projects. Average productivity declines at the industry level, since man-
agers will implement projects which maximize their interest. These projects
are not necessarily cost minimizing. Furthermore, in the empowerment equi-
librium competition becomes less intense and less sensitive to price. Recently,
Melitz (2003) has shown that trade integration brings average productivity
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gains through reallocation from high-cost to low-cost firms. Our findings
suggest, however, that this will not neccessarily be the case when firms are al-
lowed to choose their organization endogenously. Under some circumstances
firms may opt for organizations which are conducive to new ideas and less
well adept to price and cost competition.
8 Conclusions
This paper develops a theory which investigates how firms’ organizational
choices are affecting firm performance and the nature of competition in in-
ternational markets. Firm heterogeneity arises by the type of organization
firms choose which, in turn, allocates power to headquarters or middle man-
agers. The power allocation in firms, in turn, determines the amount of
information collection that firms undertake. The number of low productivity
and high productivity firms in an industry evolves endogenously depending
on the corporate equilibrium that emerges in the economy. We find that
competition is less intense in markets in which principals delegate power to
their middle managers. We also identify two new internal margins of trade
adjustment which determine whether or not trade liberalizations lead to pro-
ductivity gains.
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